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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
************************************************ 
In the Motter of the Estate of 
~11c f'ASEL, Deceased. 
No. 19265 
************************************************ 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
************************************************ 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Appellant to have this Court 
set aside his previously approved Estate Closing Order; to 
set aside a Settlement Agreement entered between the par-
ties which was approved as part of the Estate Closing 
Order; and to admit a newly discovered Will to Probc.te. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Appellc.nt's untimely Motion to Set Aside his 
own formal Estate Closing Order; to Set Aside the Settle-
ment Agreement; and to Admit a Newly Discovered Wiii to 
Probate were al I denied. The Court ruled that the Appel-
lant's informal proceeding had been formally closed upon 
the petition of the Appellant, and accordingly It became 
tlnal when entered and no new Wiii could be admitted to 
Prcbate (quoting Utah Code Annotated, 75-3-412(3)Al. The 
Court further ru I ed that the Appe 11 ant had fa i I ed to sus-
tain his buraen of proof to support his Motion to Set 
side the Settlement Agreement. From this decision deny-
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i n g o I I aspect s o f h i s Mot i on , A p p e I I an t hos f i 1 cu r r, i, 
appea I. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Responaents seek an aftirmc.tion of th~ Cisr-, 
Court's Decision and Order th.st the estate was formal: 
closed, that the Motion to Admit a NE.wly Discoverea '•i 
wc:s unt ime I y and that the Appe I I ant has presentea nc fs,- 1 , 
nor legal basis to justify setting aside his 0wn Estot, 
Closing OrdEor which incorporated the Settlement Asreemc" 
between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Decedent, Frank Chose I, died June 24, 1980 ir, 
Duchesne County as a sing I e man hav Ing d I vorcea his fcrmu 
wife, Arlene I. Chase!, prior to 1958. Frank Chase! hacc 
son by this marriage but this son 1 ived with his mothu 
and stepfather in Colorado and Nebraska (see tronscr'1 
pages 18 and 19). The Decedent, Frank Chase I, stotea L 
the Respondents during the last several years ot his 'ite 
that he be Ii eved that his son, W i I Ii am Frank cha5F 
Appe 11 ant, had been adopted by one of his stepfathus, 
Prior to his death, the Decedent gave to John Chase I, enc 
of the Respondents herein, a copy of a Wi 11 which appo -,-
ted John Chase! as Executor and, in effect, dlsinhecitcc 
the Appe I I ant. That notw i thstand Ing the Appe 11 ont t 
an informal intestate Probate action tor the Estate cf 
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•J,. e a. e u I at her i n Du c hes n e County ( Duchesne Pr 0 bate N 0 • 
P~spondents f i I ed for a form a I testate Probate on 
,c «cs1s ct the above d€scribed Will. 
q th€ time of filing the Probate, the Appellant 
wc.s represent€d by Attorney, John Beas I in, and the Respon-
oents were represented by their present counsel. A settle-
ment meeting was h6ld in John Beas I In's office on or about 
February 6, 1981 and the parties al being present reached 
0 compromised settlement entirely dividing the Estate of 
the Decedent between the parties. Said Agreement was re-
duced to writing and incorporated in the Appellant's Peti-
tion to Close the Estate. Based upon the settlement the 
Respondents agrEEd to a I I ow the Appe 1 1 ant to continue w Ith 
hi 5 Probate proceeding and Appe I I ant agreed to immediate I y 
undergo financial arrangements to raise the cash necessary 
to pay the agreed settlement. Appe I I ant was to app I y tor 
o loan and to pay th€ amounts required by the Agreement on 
or be for€ Apr i I 6, 1981. HowevEr if the amount was not 
paid, interest was to be added as stated In the Agreement. 
Although Appellant's Initial Probate proceeding 
was in forma I, Petitioner through h Is attorney, John Beas-
! in, on the 30th of July, 1981, flied a Petition tor Ap-
proval 0f th€ Final Settlement and Distribution, <tran-
script pa,,e 19) for determination of helrshlp, and as part 
·C 1 s a i d Pet i t i on , for a ppr ova 1 of the sett I em en t between 
rne rert I es. The Court set the matter for hear Ing on the 
c:th 0t July, 1981, the Appellant waived notice (tran-
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script page 30) and the Court subsequent to said hecr ir.
1 
entered on Order determining heirship (tronscript poge 3? 
and a formal Estate Clcsin~ Oroer (transcript pa~e 3a 01 
40) • 
As part of the final Crder, trre Appel lent.,, 
ordered to distribute the assets cf the Estate in occor-
dance with the Sett I ement Agreement and the Schedu I e of 
Distribution. The Appellant refused to convey any propert 1 
or assets to the Respondents. Finc.lly, almost a full ye 0 r 
after the Estate Closing Order had been entered, Appell 0 nt 
with new counsel on July 22, 1982 filed a Motion to: 
Set Aside the In form a I Probate, 2) Set Aside the Agree-
ment, and 3) Admit a Newly Discoverea Will tc Probate. 
Respondents here opposed the Mot Ion and f i I ed c. Memoro.ndum 
of Law In Opposition thereto. 
The District Court with Judge Bunne I pres i a ins 
den i e d a I I aspects of App e I I ant ' s Mot i c n an a h i s r u I i n g 
was entered on the 9th of May, 1983. Pursuant to said 
ruling, Petitioners prepared an Order which was signed by 
Judge Bunnel I on the July 18, 1983. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROBATE PROCEEDING COMMENCED BY THE 
APPELLANT WAS FORMALLY CLOSED. 
Respondents can genera I I y concede Point I ct 
Appellant's Brief, i.e. that an Order cf the Court Apprc· 
ving a Family Settlement does not in and cf itself convEJ' 
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0 n in form a I probc.te proceeding to a for me 1 proceedings. 
ll0•e<er, thot concession is not control I ing here. Appel-
lont 'gnor6s other ospects included in the Appellcnt's 
Petition for approval of final settlement and distribution 
0 ,~", net er m i n at i on o f he i rs h i p w h i ch ore tot a I I y i n cons i s -
tent with Appe I I ont 1 s pas it ion that this Estate was In-
tGrma 1 I y closed. 
The Utah Probate Code, Utah Code Annotatea 75-3 
et seq., pro• ides fer two a I terni;te methods for c I os i ng an 
estate: 
A. Informally by sworn affidavit of the Personal 
Representat Ive, ana 
B. By formal proceedings which terminate the ad-
ministration. 
The Informal closing of esti;tes by sworn affidavits is 
9overned by Utah Code Annotated 75-3-1003. That section 
al lows the Personal Re;presentatlve to ti le c. ve;rifie;d 
state;ment stating that he has pub I ished Notice to Cred-
itors, that he has properly cdminlstered the Esti;te by 
making pcyments or sett I ements or other di str I but ion of 
al I claims, and by sending a copy of that statement to al I 
distributees of the Estate. If no proceedings involving 
the Per sane I Representat Ive are pending in the Court one 
year cfter the Closing Statement Is flied, the appointment 
of the Personal Representative terminates. In short, there 
Is no Estate Closing Order and the Personal Representc.tive 
rem a Ins I I ab I e for one year after f i I Ing a ver If i ed state-
-7-
ment. The informol closing provides tor 
Order nor any determinGtion ot heirship. 
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-1001 prcv i aes an al•cr-
nate method tor formally clcsing estates. 
t ion, the Perscni: I Representative may pet it icn the 
for an Order cf Comp I ete Sett I ement cf the Estate tc ~~­
termine testacy if net previously determined, to consicu 
the f i na I account or ccmpe I or approve an account in~ '°'' 
distribution, to construe any Wi 11 er determine heirs,,,, 
to adjudicate the f i na I sett I ement and di str i but ion cf me 
Estate. Under that section, notice tc al I parties is re-
qui red and hearing must be he Id en the matter. Alter t·,, 
hearing, the Court may enter an Order approv ins tee 
sett I ement, di re ct Ing or approving di str i but ion of estctc 
and discharging the Personal Representative from cloim er 
demc:nd from any Interested person. Thus, in the fcrn.e 
closing, notice is required unless waived, c hearing 
required and an Estate ClosinSJ Order is entered. The Court 
determines who Is entitled to the distribution of"'' 
estate, determines testacy and Gpproves the final cccoc•,-
ting. He i rsh i p may a I so be determined and the Personc, 
Representative is fcrma I I y discharged. 
Appe I I ant c I eer I y mistaken I y interprets the Peti-
t ion for the Approval of the Final Settlement ano Distr · 
but ion (transcript page 19 and 20) with its attacnec 
schedule of distribution and other documents filea b) PE 
Appellant on the 30th of July, 1981 
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That document cti -
ccs! 1 cSKS for rr,ore than approval of a Settlement Agree-
nt '::(1t':.rea into between the parties. If an approval of 
os t t I eme nt Agreement is a I I that was I nt&nded and if 
,,'c esc1,te was still intended to be closed informally, 
',,c, c , ,:,u 1 d be no Estate CI os i ng Order, cou Id be no aeter-
m1naticn of heirshlp, and the Personal Representative 
_ould n'C,t be discharged. A careful reading of the Estate 
~ 1 os i ng Order revea Is that a I I of the aspects required and 
,,,,oilable in formc.I estate closings as set forth in Utah 
~cde Annotated 75-3-1 001 were incorporated in the Estate 
:~losing Order. The first paragraph of the Order states: 
"A I I r e g u I re d n o t J..£!~_.!l2..'!!_£~~!l-ll.l.'!!!l_£!:._~2.J..'!!E. , 
the Estate has been adm In I stered accord Ing to the 
laws of the State and the Orders of this Court and 
should be closed." 
Furthermore, the Order approves the final accoun-
ting of the Personal Representative, authorizes the Per-
s0nal Representative to deliver and distribute title and 
possession of the assets Jn accordance with the schedule 
end further prov I des: 
"the Personal Representative shall be fully and 
finally released and discharged from this trust and 
from any and all liability arising In connection 
with the performance of his duties as Personal Re-
presentat Ive and the adm In I strat I on of th Is estate 
shal I be closed" <transcript page 39). 
The Order further determines Intestacy and determ Ines 
11eirshlp. 
Appellant's mistakenly argue that no notices were 
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given <0nd c.t the s<0m€ time c.dmit thct Appellant specifi-
cal ly waived notice of this hear in~ (trc.nscript pac,e ;: 
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-1001 prcvia€s c rur,eay for tliv 
heirs or devisees who were emitted er not ~iv€n notice 
a Petition for Form<0I Closing of an Estc.t€. Soid sect 
provides: 
"The prev lous Order concerning testacy Is conclu-
sive as to those given notice of the earlier pro-
ceedings." 
That S€ction al lows the Court to determine testacy 65 ;-
affects only omitted persons and confirm or alter tr,, 
provisions of the Order as it €ffects a I I interested p0r-
ties as appropriate in 1 lght of the new proof. I t I u r thcr 
I im its any cha I I enge to the previous Order to those wl,c 
were omitt<0d or unnotified. The App e I I ant c I ear I y aces 
not fa I I in that category by rec.son of his obvious knc.-
ledge of the Petition, by reason of his siSJnature cftixec 
thereon (transcript pc.9e 21 ), by reason of his woivu c· 
notice (transcript page 30) <0na has no st<0nd i ng unav 
75-3-1001 (2) to cha I len9e the Estate Closing Order. 
The Court's Order f Ind Ing thc.t the c.bove Estolf 
was forma I I y c I osed on Ju I y 31, 1981 by the Estate Closins 
Order is c I ear I y corr€ct and supported by both the focts 
and the I aw and Appe I I ant has not susta I ned h Is burdu 
wh I ch wou Id a I I ow th Is Court to reverse that Order· 
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11. THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT WHICH WAS APPROVED ANO BECAME PART OF 
THE FINAL ESTATE CLOSING ORDER 
:iett I ement agreements compromising controversies 
, " eoto tcs 0re prov i aed tor by the Uni form Probate Coae, 
"A compromise of any controversy as to admission to 
probate of any Instrument offered for effect of any 
probated wt I I, !~!-~lJl.~!~-£~-l~!!~!~!~-l~-!~! 
estate of the decedent, any successor, or the ad-
m l n I strat Ion of the estate, If appoved In a formal 
P.~£.<:.~!.9.l~Jl. In the court for that purpose, Is b Ind-
l~Jl._£~-~ll_!~!_£~~!l!~-!~!~!!£L_l~.<:.l~.9.l~Jl._!~£~! 
unborn, unascertalned, or who could not be located. 
An approved compromise Is binding even though It 
may affect a trust or an Ina! !enable Interest. A 
compromised does not Impair the rights of creditors 
or of taxing authorities who are not parties to 
It." 
The ;osreement between the parties was submitted to the 
Court fer final approval pursuant to section 75-3-1102 and 
• o s c ppr o v ea by the Court as part of the t i n a I Est c. t e 
Closing Order. It thus becomes binding upon al I the par-
ties and is res adjudicata having been entered as part of 
a final order July 31, 1981. 
It is unc I ear as to what I e9a I grounds Appe I I ant 
makes for sett Ing aside the com prom I se sett I ement agree-
ment. The on I y evidence presented on that issue was in-
eluded in the affidavit of Wiiiiam Fronk Chasel filed with 
h 1 s Motion ( transcr I pt pages 41 and 42). The facts stated 
there In are sketchy, and they do not support any cone I u-
s ion of m 1 sconduct. Appe I I ant states no case nor statutory 
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authority tor his Motion. He obviously failEa to file. 
timely appeal to the Estate Closing Graer. His c n I Cr :::: l 
ab I e statutory remedy appears to be unaer Ru I e 60l. 
affidavit and brief ot the Appel lo.nt appear tc ur,;e 0 "' 
tc.ke of Lsct, i nodvert€nCE;, surprise, sxcusab IE nei; 1 i jf~,·, 
newly discovered 6vidence, and perhaps even frc.ua, m'sr,· 
presentation or other misconduct en the part cf tne :,. 
sponaents. All of the c.lle<;ea but unprovea allc"c: 
raised by Appe I I cnt' s At ti davit and Brief are coverc, 
Rule 60b which provid6s tor relief from final judgment :r 
order for the to 11 owing rec.sons: 
"1. Mistake, Inadvertence, surprise or excuseable 
neglect; 
2. Newly discovered evidence which by due deli-
gence could not have been discovered In time 
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(bl; 
3. Fraud (whether heretofore dominated Intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other mis-
conduct of an adverse party." 
Respondents only conclusion as to why Appellant oia nv 
quote Rule 60b is the obvious time limitation impcsc· 
therein: 
"the Motion shal I be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (11, C2l, (3), or C4l not more than 
!~~~~-~£~!~~-~i!~~-!~~-l~ia~~~!L_£~i~~L-£~-R~£: 
ceedlng was entered or taken." 
Appellant's Motion to Set Aside this juds,rr,ent incorpcr 
ting the agreement was not made unt i I a I most one 1" 
a tter the Order was entered ana Appe I I ant is c I ear I Y net 
entitled relief under Rule 60b. Any c Io im for fraud, m':· 
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r 6 presentotion, mistak€, excuseable neglect, etc. had Ion,; 
been b 6 r re d pr I or to the f i I I n g of App e I I ant ' s Mot i 0 n • 
1 1" THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW THE PROBATE 
OF A NEWLY DISCOVERED WILL. 
Although the App€11ant in his Brief under the 
,eel ic,n entitled "Relief Sought Under Appeal", is urging 
th;s Court to admit a newly aiscovered Will to Probate, 
the Appel lont's Brief apparently abandons this point as no 
author I ty is argued in support thereof. In ight of the 
references and requests of the Appellant to admit the 
newly discovered Wi 11 to Probate, Respondents provide the 
to I lowing authority with respect to that request. 
The Uniform Probate Code makes provision for 
odmission for a newly discovered Will after initiation of 
Probate proceedings, Section 75-3-412(1) provides: 
" ( 1) Subject to appea I and subject to vacat Ion as 
provided In this section and In section 75-3-413, a 
formal testacy order under this part, Including .e!l 
order that the decedent I ett no va 11 d w 111 and 
aeTermrnlng-nelrs:-1s-rlnaT-as-to-all-persons with 
~~~£~£!_!£_~ll_l~~~!~_££!!.£!~~~s_!~-i!£!£~~!~~ 
!~!2!!_!~~!_!~!_££~~!_££~l£!C!£_£~-!!!.l.\lb.!_~2.Y..!. 
considered Incident to Its rendition relevant to 
the question of whether the decedent left a val Id 
wl I I and to the determination of heirs except that: 
(al The court shal I entertain a petition tor mod-
i fl cation or vacation of Its order and probate of 
another w 11 I of the decedent If It Is shown that 
the-prcpanents-ott"he-1ater~allere}~~111_~!~!-~~~ 
aware of Its ex I stence at the time of the earl ler 
~~££~~~I~~=£E=~~E~=~~~~~~!_£i_!~!_!~cll!c_R~£~ 
£~~£l~~-~~£-~!~!_Sl~!~ no notice of It, except by 
~ubl !cation. 
b) If Intestacy of all or part of the estate has 
been ordered, the determination of heirs of the 
decedent may be recons I dered If It ls shown that 
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one or more persons were omitted from the deter-
m I nat Ion and It Is also shown that the persons were 
unaware of their relationship to the decedent, were 
unaware of his death, or were given no notice of 
any proceeding concerning his estate, except by 
pub I I cation. 
(c) The order originally rendered in the testacy 
proceeding may be modified or vacated, if appro-
priate under the circumstances, by the order of 
probate of later-offered wl I I or the order redeter-
mining heirs ••• 
( 3 l A pet It I on for vacat I on under e I ther subs.c-
t Ions (ll Cal or (bl must be filed prior to the 
earl fer of the fol lowln time I Im Its: 
a _..f._2__£_ersonal representative has been appoin-
ted for the estate, the time of entry of any order 
2..2..2.!:.£.'.:..i.!lri. f i n a I d I st r I b u t i on o f t h e e st ate , cir-;-Tf 
the estate Is closed by statement, six months after 
the fifing of the closing statement. 
( b) Whether or not a persona I representat Ive has 
been appointed for the estate of the decedent, the 
time prescribed by section 75-3-107 when It Is no 
longer possible to Initiate an original proceeding 
to probate a wl I I of the decedent. 
(cl Twelve months after the entry of the order 
sought to be vacated." 
In ana I yz Ing the time periods prov I ded in section 
3, It is Important to note that the earlier time period, 
that is the first time period to lapse, controls. Unaer 
3(al, since a Personal Representative was appointed in 
this Estate, the cut-off point for admission of a new 'Hill 
to Probate is either Cal the time cf entry of an Order 
approving the final distribution of the estate, or, lbl if 
the estate is closed Informally by statement, six months 
after the ti I Ing of the closing statement. I t is c I eor 
that the time periods provided in subparagraph 3(al wil 
cont r o I as they c. r E the ear I i er cf the a I tern il t e ti"' 
periods provided in pc:ragrc,ph (bl c,nd (cl. Under pora-
graph (bl e; time wou Id be three years from the date 0 ' 
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,Jc c t h • n i c r, •cs Ju n E 2 4, I 9 8 0 on d under par a graph ( c l 
", ,~ I 'J c e t w E I v t- months a ft er the entry cf the Order o f 
It is important to note that whether the Court 
eels the Appel lcnt's position that the Estate •cs in-
t~rmal ly clos<0d in July, 1981 or whether the Court accepts 
ths Respondents 1 version that the Estate was formal I y 
_10sea, the time periods provided for admission of a new 
Wi 11 to Probate expired prior to the ti I ing of Appel I ant's 
Met ion. Assuming for the purposes of argument that the 
document filed by the Appellant on the 30th of July, 1981 
was a closing statement rather than a Petition for Formal 
Closing, the Appellant would have only six months from 
said date to fl le a Petition to Admit a New WI 11 to Pro-
bate. If, however, the lower Court's position Is affirmed 
which adopted Respondents' view that the Estate was form-
ally closed, then the new Will would have to be admitted 
prior to execution of the Estate Closing Order which was 
July 31, 1981. 
In I lght of the foregoing, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Appel I ant has apparently abandoned his re-
quest that the new I y discovered Wi I I be admitted to Pre-
bote, at it is cleorly untimely. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE THAT THE FAMILY SETTLEMENT WAS PROCURED BY 
DURESS. 
The chief thrust of the Appellant's Brief ls that 
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the "young and impress ion ab I e" Appe I I ant 
into signing a settlement agreement. Appe I I ant concedes, 
however , ''that i t i s not duress to th re at c n t 0 d 0 th a i 
whicr1 one has a legal right to do, i.e., threaten tc , it 
gate a claim asserted in good faith" (Appellant's er,, 
page 81. The on I y evidence offered by the Appe 11 2 rit ~' 
said duress was in his Affidavit dated July 22, 1982. The 
only duress claimed in said Affidavit is set forth in Par-
agraphs 3 or 4 which relate to the Respondents' fil inc;,,. 
c, separate Probate action based upon a Wi I I. The Appel lent 
refers to these as threats of 
they were more thc,n threats. 
itigation but, in feet, 
A I itii;ation had el reed/ 
been commenced by Respondents for Probate of the aforemen-
1-ioned Wi 11. Appe I I ant further ars.ues in his Br itf thot 
his own attorney told him that "he had to settle and thot 
the Appe I I ant was I ead to be I ieve that he had no other 
option that he would lose everythini; if he did not sign 
the settlement" (Appellant's Brief page 9). It is ncr 
c I ear from Appe I I ant 1 s Br i et whether that be I ief came from 
Respondents or from Appe I I ant's own counse I. 
In eval uatlng Appel I ant's "pure heart and empt1 
head" argument and in his apparent appeal to the equitcble 
powers of the Court to relieve him from this Settlemcn 1 
Agreement, Respondents urge that the Court review al I ,,, 
the equities of the case. "He who seeks equity must oc 
equity." The pert i es entered into a good faith arms· 
lenyth transaction at a time when good faith end IE\i 
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reached, Respcndents a I I owed the Appe I I cnt to 
'"'I control of al I of the assets of the Estate which 
ccrdcnce with the accounting ct the Appellant total 
11 F,el.98 (transcript page 29 - 9ross estate). Respon-
"'''T" 1n their agreement provided that Appellant would 
rove 60 days interest tree to pay amounts due which was 
believed by all parties to be a time period sufficiently 
1 ong to a I I ow the Appe I I ant to ob ta In the funds to pay oft 
the Sett I ement Agreement. Th Is Sett I ement Agreement was 
made on February 6, 1981. Appel I ant had five and one-ha If 
months to consider and act on the agreement prior to peti-
tioning the Court tor approval of the same on July 30, 
1981. At no time during the five and one-half month per-
iod, did Appe I I ant assert any ot the fraud or duress 
c I aims. These c I aims were f I rst made a I most a year and 
one-ha It after the agreement was made. In the me<rntime, 
the Appe I I ant, knowing that Respondents were re I y i ng upon 
the settlement, has taken possession of the property with-
out contest, has used the assets awarded to him as he de-
sired, and has had al of the benefits of the agreement. 
In further evaluating Appellant's conduct it Is 
important to note that even though the Estate Closing 
Order entered in Ju J y 31, 1981 requ Ired h Im to deed cer-
tain property to the Respondents (transcript page 37) no 
coflveyance has been made to Respondents, even though, 
Appellant has deeded all of the other properties to him 
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self provided in the schedule of distribution. It is 
apparent that Appe I I cnt hes never intended to comp I y wit,, 
the Court 1 s Estate CI cs i ng Order c.nd that the Mot ion f 11 ,, 
almost c year after the Estate Closing Order is sim~, 
bc.d faith c.ttempt on the part of the Appel lc.nt tc c.vcicJ 
Settlement Agree;ment which he has had the benefit of frc" 
the dc.te of its inception. The Appe I I ant has prov i aed nc 
ev i aence of frc.ud er mi srepresentct ion en the pc.rt of thE 
Responde;nts justifying the; Court's inte;rvention particu-
larly at this late date. On the contrary the Appe 11 ant c1 
his own willful disobedie;nce of the Order has evioencEc 
his own baa faith and contempt. 
IN SUMMARY 
Appel I ant contends that the only rational conclu-
sion from the documents presented by the Appe I I ant at the 
time of c I os i ng the EstctE is that the App6 I I ant i ntenaeo 
the EstatE to be closed formally. HowEver, a classlfiu-
tion of the closing as formol or Jnformcl is not neces-
sc;r i I y contra I Ii ng upon the othEr i ssuEs prEsEnted by thE 
Appe I I ant, s i nee a W i I I of fEred more than 61 Even months 
after a formal or informal closing Is untimely. 
The parties h6r6to entered into a cornpromisec 
agreemEnt which was approved by the Court in accordonCE 
with the Utah Uniform Prob;ote Code. This agrEement beco~•' 
part of thE fine.I EstatE Closing Order. ThE Estc.te Closin9 
Order was neve:.r appea I I Ed f ram nor was any t i me I y Mo I i 
1' 
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•cc1t fer relief from seid Ord6r under Rul6 60b. Th 6 
,,,,cs cf fraud, rr,istake, 6tc. rais6d by th6 App6llant ar6 
.,,,rc,J by res juaicoto ond sold Order has beccme final. 
1 t is not now cha I I eng6ab I e by 6 i th er party. 
B6couse the new I y discovered W i 11 cannot now be 
pr,Gatea as a result of its untimely discovery, It cannot 
serve as a mistake of fact justifying the Appellant in 
rescinding his prior Settlement Agreement. 
The Respondents respectfu 11 y request thot the 
Court affirm the decision of the lower Court. 
DATED this 
hereby certify that 
day of November, 1983. 
RAYMOND A. HINTZE 
Attorney for Respondents 
ma i I ed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to GEORGE E. MANGAN, Attorney for Appel lent, at 
47 North Second East, Roosevelt, Utah 84066, postage prepaid on 
th i s day of November, 1983. 
LINDA ANNE TABOR, Secretary 
-19-
